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The recent onslaught of corporate scandals has compelled the world to acknowledge 
the profound impact of corporate governance practices on the global economy. 
Corporate governance has become important for the survival of companies and indeed 
of national economies in the increasingly global economy. Corporate governance is of 
particular concern in developing economies, where the infusion of international 
investor capital and foreign aid is essential to economic stability and growth. For 
transition economies, such as Uganda’s, which are faced with the challenge of 
restructuring for greater efficiency and creating a foreign investment-friendly 
environment, good corporate governance is crucial for success. 
 
This research highlights corporate governance initiatives in Uganda, focusing on the 
proposed corporate governance reforms. An analysis of the major corporate 
governance reforms is done including; statutory reforms, development of codes of 
conduct and best practice and institutional reforms. The evolution of Uganda’s 
corporate structure and the forces driving corporate governance reform is examined.  It 
is noted that corporations in Uganda cannot shield themselves from the global 
movement that is shaping standard principles governing corporations. Therefore the 
global principles of corporate governance are examined concerning how they can serve 
as models for enhancing corporate governance standards in Uganda. The analysis is 
based on the need to bring Uganda’s corporate governance reforms in line with 
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1.1 The background to corporate governance 
 
At its most elementary, corporate governance is simply about the interaction and 
relationship among the various participants, or stakeholders, in determining both the 
performance and the direction of companies.
1
 The modern company is a relatively 
recent creation of the common law and its genesis may be traced back to 1897
2
 in the 
landmark pronouncement of the English House of Lords in Salomon v Salomon & Co 
Ltd,
3
 where it was held that ‘a company has a legal existence with rights and liabilities 
of its own, whatever may have been the ideas and schemes of those who brought it into 
existence’. The foundation of modern company law lies in the Salomon’s case, as the 
veil of incorporation effectively segregates the owners from the management of the 
company.  
 
The company may therefore be viewed as a conduit with two masters, namely, the 
board of directors deciding as a collective unit and the members deciding at a general 
meeting.
4
 While this may, at first glance, raise conceptual difficulties as regards the 
precise scope of the respective authority of the board of directors and of the general 
meeting, the issue is deflected by the articles of association conferring wide powers of 
management of the affairs of the company to its board of directors. The general 
meeting may not override the directors and involve itself in the management of the 
company.
5
 In short, while shareholders have the theoretical right to elect persons of 
their choice to the board, they do not have the ability to instruct such persons on 
matters that pertain to the affairs of the company.
6
  
                                                 
1
 Low Chee Keong ‘Disclosure Reporting, and Derivative Actions: Empowering Shareholders in 
   Southeast Asia’ in Ho Khai Leong (ed) Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia:  
  Economics, Politics, and Regulations (2005) ISEAS Publications at 38. 
2
 John Farrar Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand (2001) Oxford University Press, at 
   23. 
3
 [1897] AC 22 
4
 Keong (note 1) at 39. 
5
 See the case of Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34. 
6
 Keong (note 1) at 39. 
 2 
 
The modern corporate environment has resulted in the division of ownership and 
control in many companies so that a company’s directors have taken the place of its de 
facto owners (its shareholders) in directing and controlling the affairs of the company.
7
 
Traditional corporate doctrine has assumed the separation of ownership from control 
as the core problem of corporate governance.
8
 In this view, the primary function of 
corporate law is to devise strategies and mechanisms to ensure that those in control of 
shareholders’ property apply it strictly for the benefit of shareholders. This separation 
of ownership and control together with the increasing involvement of  other 
stakeholders who have an interest in the business of the company – financiers, 
surrounding communities and employees for instance – has accordingly given rise to 
the need for a predictable, uniform and comprehensive system of control based on the 




1.2 The research question 
 
The research question to be addressed by this study is whether the corporate 
governance reforms in Uganda are sufficient to meet internationally accepted standards 
and whether international standards are good for Uganda. The research further 
analyses codes of corporate governance versus legislating corporate governance 
principles in determining the best approach for Uganda. 
 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
 
This paper seeks to analyse the proposed corporate governance reforms in Uganda as 
contained in the Study Report on Company Law, the Companies Bill, 2004 and the 
Code of Good Corporate Governance; and their effectiveness in addressing corporate 
governance issues in the country and as an international competitor in the 21
st
 century. 
The scope of this analysis generally covers the principles of good corporate 
                                                 
7






governance as they have come to be widely accepted, but will concentrate more on the 
board, individual directors and their duties, the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, 
compliance and enforcement; but will not include risk management, disclosure and 
reporting. The study also analyses the corporate governance institutional framework in 
Uganda. 
 
In assessing the proposed corporate governance reforms and whether they are in 
harmony with reforms in other jurisdictions, the paper makes a comparison with South 
Africa which is about to overhaul its company law, in some cases basing this on the 
recommendations contained in the King Report by the King Committee
10
 on corporate 
governance and in other cases on the provisions of the Companies Bill, 2007. In the 
international arena, the corporate governance reforms of the United Kingdom as 
contained in the Companies Act, 2006 and the Combined Code
11
 on corporate 
governance are examined. 
 
1.4 Corporate governance: An overview 
1.4.1 What is corporate governance? 
 
Corporate governance has become an issue of global importance, but exactly what 
constitutes corporate governance and precisely where its boundaries lie are still 
subjects of debate.
12
 It is an emerging discipline and one about which relatively little 
has been written especially in developing countries.
13
 The term corporate governance 
                                                 
10
 The King Committee, formed in 1993 by the Institute of Directors in South Africa (IoD) was 
    established to investigate the role of boards of directors in South African firms. The Committee was 
    named after Mervyn E. King who chaired it. The committee released its first report on corporate 
   governance in 1994 (‘the Code’ or ‘King I’) which included a Code of Corporate Practice and 
   Conduct, the first of its kind in South Africa. The second King Report on corporate governance (‘King 
   II’) was published in 2002 succeeding King I. 
11
 The initial documents on corporate governance in UK were the Cadbury Report (1992) and the  
    Greenbury Report (1995). Later, Hampel (1998) reviewed the implementation of the Cadbury and  
    Greenbury Codes and the outcome of this report was the Combined Code 1998. There were further 
    reports by Turnbull (1999) on internal controls, Higgs (2003) on the role of non-executive directors, 
    and Smith (2003) on audit committees. In 2003, a new Combined Code was issued. This superseded  
    the earlier code and drew on the Turnbull, Higgs, and Smith guidelines. A latest revision of the 
    Combined Code took place in June 2006. 
12
  Naidoo (note 7) at 1 
13
  Ibid 
 4 
is often defined as the formal system of accountability by senior management to the 
shareholders. A more expansive definition includes the entire set of legal rules, 
relations and behaviors that constitute the system by which a company is controlled 
and directed. 
  
Scholars and practitioners of corporate governance give the term a wide variety of 
definitions.
14
 Economists and social scientists tend to define it broadly as “the 
institutions that influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns” 
and “the organizations and rules that affect expectations about the exercise of control 
of resources in firms”.
15
 The definition focuses not only on the formal rules and 
institutions of corporate governance, but also on the informal practices that evolve in 
the absence or weakness of formal rules. 
 
Corporate managers, investors, policy makers, and lawyers, on the other hand, tend to 
employ a more narrow definition.
16
 For them, corporate governance is the system of 
rules and institutions that determine the control and direction of the corporation and 
that define relations among the corporation’s primary participants. Thus the United 
Kingdom’s 1992 Cadbury Report’s often quoted definition is: “Corporate governance 
is the system by which businesses are directed and controlled.”
17
 As applied in 
practice, this narrower definition focuses almost exclusively on the internal structure 
and operation of the corporation’s decision-making process. It has been this narrower 
definition that has been central to public policy discussions about corporate 







                                                 
14
 Jeswald W. Salacuse ‘Corporate Governance in the New Century’ (2004) 25 No.3 The company 






 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report) 
    Para.2.5 available at www.ecgn.org. accessed on 21
st
 July 2007.  
18
 Salacuse (note 14) at 69. 
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1.4.2 Why corporate governance? 
 
“Good corporate governance helps to prevent corporate scandals, fraud, and 
potential civil and criminal liability of the organization. It is also good 
business. A good corporate governance image enhances the reputation of the 
organization and makes it more attractive to customers, investors, suppliers, 




With the dawn of the twenty-first century, corporate governance has attained 
heightened importance and attention in government policy circles, academia, and the 
popular press throughout much of the world.
20
 Various reasons explain its current 
prominence. The new century’s financial scandals affecting major American firms, 
such as Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Andersen, and the resulting loss of confidence 
of the investing public in the stock market led to dramatic declines in share prices and 
substantial financial losses to millions of individual investors.
21
 Both the public and 





Even before the recent scandals, significant efforts, propelled to a certain extent by 





 and individual European countries to understand the 
                                                 
19
 Frederick D. Lipman and L Keith Lipman Corporate Governance Best Practices: Strategies for 
    Public, Private, and Not-for-Profit Organisations (2006) at 3. 
20






 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Principle of Corporate 
    Governance (endorsed by the Ministers at the OECD Meeting, May 26-27, 1999), Paris, OECD, 
    1999. also available at www.oecd.org. In the wake of the financial scandals in the United States and  
     the growing international concern over corporate governance, the OECD Council at Ministerial level  
    at its meeting of May 15-16 2002, launched a new initiative to strengthen corporate governance.  
    OECD launched an assessment within the member countries and came up with new corporate 
    governance guidelines in 2006. 
24
 See Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, on behalf of the European commission, International Market 
    Directorate General ‘comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European 
    Union and its Member States (January 2002). Available at 
 6 
economic consequences of corporate governance and to formulate recommendations 
on appropriate governance structures and practices. In emerging market economies, 
experience over the last decade has clearly shown that successful privatizations and the 
development of vibrant private sectors depend to a significant extent on the existence 
of effective systems of corporate governance.
25
 More generally, the ability of countries 
to attract foreign capital is affected by their systems of corporate governance and the 
degree to which corporate management is compelled to respect the legal rights of 
lenders, bondholders, and non-controlling shareholders. Individual and institutional 
investors will refrain from providing capital or will demand a higher risk premium for 
their capital from enterprises in countries without effective systems of corporate 
governance than from similar enterprises in countries having strong corporate 
governance standards.
26
 International investment not only provides corporations with 
expanding sources of capital, but also encourages the continued integration of sound 
corporate governance practices, which may help the corporations to gain the trust of 




Corporate governance is also perceived as important mainly for companies whose 
shares trade on the stock market. In developing countries, the preponderance of small 
firms that do not have listed shares, on the one hand, and of large state-owned, foreign-
owned and private family-owned companies whose shares are also not widely traded 
locally, on the other, helps explain why many people still doubt the significance of 
corporate governance for developing countries.
28
   
 
                                                                                                                                             
    http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/news/corp-gov [Accessed on 25 July 
   2007. 
25
 See Alexander Dyck ‘Privatisation and Coporate Governance: Principles, Evidence and Future 
    Challenges’ (2002) 16 World Bank Observer 59-84; Saul Estrin ‘Corporate Governance and  
     Privatisation: Lessons from Transition Economies’ (2002) 11 Journal of African Economies 28; Saul  
     Estrin ‘Competition and Corporate Governance inTransition Economies’ (2002) 16/1 Journal of  
     Economic Perspectives 101-124. 
26
  Salacuse (note 14) at 70. 
27
  Melinda Vaughn and Lori Verstegen Ryan, ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: a bellwether for 
     the continent?’ Corporate Governance: An International Review (September 2006) Vol.14 No.5. 
28
 OECD ‘Corporate Governance in Development: The Experiences of Brazil, Chile, 
    India, and SA.’ Available at www.oecd.org/document/49/ [accessed on 3 March 2007]. 
 7 
However, for a firm to raise capital by selling equity at a price worthwhile to its 
owners, a firm needs credibly to promise to abide by both principles of good corporate 
governance-striving to maximize its future residuals and guaranteeing shareholders 
some determinable proportion of these residuals as dividends or other distributions. 
The expectation of eventually receiving such distributions is what makes worthwhile 
holding a share as a financial instrument and what induces outsiders to provide cash in 
return for shares.
29
 A firm gains credibility in several ways: by developing a record of 
abiding by its promises, by being subject to a binding legal system, and by 
restructuring incentives so that managers gain if they fulfill their promises and suffer if 
they do not. If a firm acts contrary to its promises, it undermines its own record and 
becomes less able to acquire new equity financing. It should also be noted that when a 
legal system fails to punish such a firm, an individual firm’s decision to break its 
promises imposes externalities: investors become generally less willing to buy equity 
of other firms governed by the same legal system. In other words, weak corporate 





2. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
IN UGANDA 
 
 2.1 Institutional framework  
2.1.1    An overview of the economy 
 
Uganda is a landlocked country located in East Africa, covering an area of 241,039 sq 
km with a population of 24.7 million.
31
 The country is bordered by Sudan in the north, 
Kenya in the east, the United Republic of Tanzania in the south, Rwanda in south-west 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west.
32
 Uganda’s economy is dominated 
                                                 
29
 Merritt B. Fox and Michael A. Heller (eds) Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy 
    Reforms (2006) Princeton University Press at 6. 
30
 Fox and Heller (note 29) at 7. 
31
 This information on Uganda’s economy is available on the Uganda Investment Authority website at 




by the agricultural sector which accounts for 31.4% of the country’s GDP. The 
reliance of the national economy on cash crops for foreign exchange is a legacy of 
Uganda’s colonial period. At independence in 1962, Uganda was one of Africa’s most 
economically promising states. It was self sufficient in food production and its 
manufacturing sector produced basic inputs and consumer goods. However, from 1971 
to mid 1980 the economy fell into a crisis under the strain of civil wars and poor 
economic programmes such as the nationalization of industries and the expulsion of 
Asians who were the key players in the economy.
33
 Uganda has substantial natural 
resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall and sizable mineral deposits of copper 
and cobalt. Coffee is the major export crop and accounts for the bulk of export 
revenues.
34
 Uganda falls among the countries classified as the world’s least-developed 
countries. 
 
Under the influence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
the Uganda government acted to rehabilitate and stabilise the economy by undertaking 
privatization of the industry and services, currency reform and the liberalization of the 
exchange rate system. Due to a combination of these reforms and a relative degree of 
security in the country, the economy has consistently enjoyed high rates of growth. 
Uganda has been one of Africa’s recent success stories with its reports of economic 
growth. Uganda has for the last fifteen years pursued economic policy reforms that 
have imposed fiscal discipline, restructured public expenditure and liberalised the 
economy. Because of the prudent macro economic policies, Uganda has recorded an 
impressive economic performance over the last decade with an average real rate of 




During 1990-2001, the economy turned in a solid performance based on continued 
investment in the rehabilitation of the infrastructure, improved incentives for 
production and exports, reduced inflation, gradually improved domestic security, and 
the return of exiled Indian-Ugandan entrepreneurs. The government has facilitated 
                                                 
33




 Uganda Investment Authority (note 31). 
 9 
foreign investment with attractive incentives and streamlined import and export 
procedures.
36
 Yet Uganda still suffers from considerable economic difficulties. The 
economy is dependent on the continued flow of aid from external donors. Total 
external debt has risen and corruption is prevalent in the government and the private 




2.1.2 The Capital Markets Authority 
 
The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) was established in 1996 following the 
enactment of the Capital Markets Authority Act.
38
 The mandate of the CMA is to 
promote, develop and regulate the capital markets industry in Uganda. As observed by 
CMA chief executive officer Japheth Katto,
39
 before 1996, the economy was not 
conducive for capital markets development because the key sectors like banking and 
insurance were dominated by government-owned enterprises. Liberalisation and 
privatisation created the right environment for the capital markets to start. In exercise 
of the powers conferred on the CMA by the Capital Markets Authority Act,
40
 the CMA 
has made the Capital Markets Corporate Governance Guidelines, 2003.
41
 Rule 2 of the 
guidelines provides that the CMA developed the guidelines as a minimum standard for 
good corporate governance practices by public companies and issuers of corporate 
debt in Uganda. It is stated that the guidelines were provided in response to the 
growing importance of governance issues in emerging and developing economies and 
for promoting domestic and regional capital markets growth. It is also in recognition of 
the role of good governance in corporate performance, capital formation and 
maximisation of shareholders value as well as protection of investor’s rights.   
 
The objective of the Guidelines as stated in rule 6 is to strengthen corporate 
governance practices by listed companies in Uganda and promote the standards of self-
                                                 
36
 Uganda Investment Authority (note 31). 
37
 (Note 33). 
38
 Chapter 84 Revised Laws of Uganda, 2000. 
39
 As quoted in a Ugandan news paper, the New Vision of Wednesday, 11
th
 July, 2007. 
40
  Capital Markets Authority Act, Chapter 84 Revised Laws of Uganda, 2000, section 101. 
41
 The Corporate governance guidelines are available at the CMA website at http://www.cma.co.ug.  
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regulation in other public companies so as to bring the level of governance in line with 
international trends. The Guidelines require the directors of every listed company to 
undertake or commit themselves to adopt good corporate governance practices as part 
of their continuing listing obligations. Rule 10 provides that compliance with the 
Guidelines forms an essential part of disclosure obligations in corporate annual reports 
and disclosure of all areas of non-compliance or alternative practices also forms part of 
disclosure requirements. Rule 11 provides that where a company is not fully compliant 
with the Guidelines, the directors have to indicate the steps being taken to adhere to 
full compliance and the reasons for departure.  
 
The Guidelines provide for the following corporate governance principles: 
 best practices relating to the board of directors; 
 best practices relating to the position of chairperson and chief executive; 
 best practices relating to the rights of shareholders; 
 best practices relating to the conduct of general meetings; and 
 best practices relating to the accountability and the role of audit committees. 
 
Clearly, according to rule 11, the CMA requires listed companies to comply with the 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance and where they have not complied, they must 
explain. As noted above, the guidelines apply to listed companies on the Uganda Stock 
Exchange, although all public companies are encouraged to follow the guidelines. 
Considering that only six local companies are listed on the securities exchange, the 
guidelines are not applicable to the majority of the companies in Uganda which are 
mainly small privately owned companies. However, it should be noted that these 
guidelines are essential in ensuring good corporate governance among the companies 
to which they apply.   
 
2.1.3 The Uganda Securities Exchange and the listing requirements 
 
The Uganda Securities Exchange (USE) is Uganda’s only stock exchange. It was 
founded in June, 1997. The USE is operated under the jurisdiction of Uganda’s Capital 
 11 
Markets Authority, which in turn reports to the central bank of Uganda, the Bank of 
Uganda.
42
 The Exchange’s doors opened to trading in January, 1998. At the time the 
Exchange had just one listing, a bond issued by the East African Development Bank.
43
 
The USE currently trades nine listed local and East African companies and has started 
the trading of fixed income instruments. There are six local companies listed on USE 
and these are: Uganda Clays Ltd, British American Tobacco (BAT) Uganda Ltd, Bank 
of Baroda (U) Ltd, DFCU Bank Ltd, New Vision Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd and 
Stanbic Bank Uganda Ltd. Cross border listings are: East African Breweries Ltd, 
Kenya Airways and Jubilee Holdings Ltd. The USE operates in close association with 
the Dar-es-Salaam Stock Exchange in Tanzania and the Nairobi Stock Exchange in 
Kenya.   
 
There is some progress towards transparent corporate governance represented by the 
Uganda Securities Exchange’s listing requirements. The USE listing requirements are 
contained in the Uganda Securities Exchange Listing Rules, 2003. The Listing Rules 
provide that issuers must comply not only with the Listing Rules of the Exchange but 
with the rules and regulations made under the Capital Markets Authority Act, the 
Companies Act and any other statutory requirements.  
 
The mandate of administering the Listing Rules is given to the Listing Committee of 
the Governing Council of the Uganda Securities Exchange limited. Under rule 3, the 
Listing Committee is constituted by the Governing Council and its mandate is to grant, 
review, suspend or terminate a listing of securities. It is also the mandate of the 
Committee to prescribe from time to time listing requirements with which issuers must 
comply before listing and while a security remains listed. Under rule 4, the Committee 
has powers to suspend a listing of securities if in its opinion it is desirable to do so in 
the interest of market fairness, transparency or efficiency, or if the issuer has failed to 
comply with the Listing Rules. Rule 7 gives the Committee powers to de-list an issuer 
who has failed to satisfy conditions for listing. The Committee terminates listings 
                                                 
42






subject to the approval of the Capital Markets Authority and is required to issue a 
public statement on the delisting of the security. In addition to the powers of 
suspension or termination, the Committee has powers under rule 9 to censure or 
impose penalties on an issuer for contravention of the Listing Rules. 
 
The listing requirements provide for financial transparency, regular reporting and 
auditing requirements. The listing rules require directors and senior management of an 
issuer to have collective appropriate expertise and experience for the management of 
the business and details of such expertise should be disclosed in listing particulars by 
the issuer. In abide to ensure proper accountability, the rules require financial 
statements to be prepared and independently audited in accordance with international 
accounting standards. Rule 51 requires an issuer to ensure that all the necessary 
facilities and information are available to enable shareholders to exercise their rights, 
such as, adequate notice for meetings, right to exercise their right to vote, and access to 
information. 
  
2.1.4 The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda 
 
The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) was incorporated in 
December 1998 as a company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital. 
Membership of the Institute is open to both corporate entities and individuals. In an 
interview with Vincent F. Kaheeru
44
 the CEO of the Institute, he revealed that the 
Institute has a membership base of 42 corporate bodies and 306 individuals as at 31
st
 
July 2007. The ICGU was set up to complement the efforts other institutions are 
making towards improving the manner in which corporate entities operate. The 
mission of ICGU is to promote excellence in corporate governance principles and 
practice. The objectives of ICGU include: 
 Training and promotion of commercial probity and effective management with 
emphasis on transparency and integrity in the business community; 
                                                 
44
 The interview was conducted on 14
th
 August 2007 at the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda 
    offices in Kampala. 
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 Enhancing performance of boards, individual directors and senior management 
in the private, public and NGO sectors by improving their knowledge, personal 
development and professional skills, particularly with regard to their rights, 
duties, responsibilities and liabilities, for the benefit of all stakeholders; 
 Developing codes of best practice for good corporate governance within the 
public, private and NGO sectors; 
 Contributing to capacity building in corporations by imparting good 
management practices to directors and senior managers; 
 Providing an effective voice for company directors and senior management of 
enterprises in public affairs with effective interest in legislation, economic and 
social matters to ensure the preservation of basic commercial freedom and to 
prevent abuse of such freedom.  
In its manual on corporate governance,
45
 ICGU has provided a code of best practice 
and guidelines for good corporate governance for companies in Uganda. The 
guidelines set out the basic framework within which corporate governance can thrive. 
It is stated in the manual that the guidelines are generic in nature and each individual 
firm or organization is expected to develop its own code based on the provided 
framework to suit its peculiar circumstances. The ICGU recommends the guidelines 
for use by all corporate bodies in Uganda irrespective of the form of ownership and 
size of the entity. It should be noted that these guidelines are too flexible and the ICGU 
does not have any enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance. In the 
interview with Vincent Kaheeru
46
 the CEO of the Institute, he stated that all member 
corporations are required to abide by the guidelines thereby serving as an example to 
other organizations. Compliance with the guidelines is on a voluntary basis. 
 
The ICGU’s recommended guidelines for corporate governance in Uganda cover the 
following broad areas: 
 The board of directors: objectives of the board; board composition, 
appointments and elections; induction, orientation and training of directors; 
                                                 
45
 Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda Manual on Corporate Governance: Incorporating 
    Recommended Guidelines for Uganda (2002). 
46
 ( Note 44). 
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board chairman and CEO; the board and other stakeholders; the board’s sole 
responsibility for the company’s performance; internal systems and controls; 
the audit committee; compliance with laws and regulations; communication; 
good faith and confidentiality; assessment of the company, board and 
management performance and codes of ethics; 
 Shareholders: shareholders’ meetings; communication; evaluation of the 
company’s perfoamnce; shareholders’ duties to each other; duties to employees 
and the community; 
 Others include the roles of the following; audits, management, employees, 
Government, regulatory bodies, suppliers of a company, lenders, customers, 
investors and the community. 
  
The activities of the ICGU include; development of a corporate governance manual for 
directors and managers, training of directors and managers in corporate governance, 
sensitization of stakeholders and advising government on essential legal reforms for 
promoting corporate governance. A crucial aspect of efforts to improve corporate 
governance standards involves investing in human resource capital. Promoting training 
and education at all levels is therefore necessary to ensure that corporate governance 
reforms take root in the country. The programmes seek to enhance the effectiveness of 
directors in discharging their duties, and ensure that they are continuously updated on 
developments in the securities industry, particularly in areas of corporate governance 
and other regulatory developments. 
 
The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda seeks to complement the promotion 
of corporate governance by organizing training, education and research. It conducts 
seminars, workshops and other training and education for a wide-ranging of audience 
that includes directors and other managers. It publishes educational materials and 
provides general information on corporate governance. In ‘Sustainable Wealth 
Creation’, a quarterly publication of the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda, 
there is a lot of information which educates investors, directors and other stakeholders 
on issues including: shareholder rights, investment and wealth creation, practicing 
 15 
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and corporate fraud, among 
others.  
 
2.2 The history of corporate law in Uganda and the need for reform 
2.2.1 Uganda’s corporate history 
 
For most of the post independence period, Uganda’s major institutions were state-
owned.
47
 There was no opportunity of creating an environment for checks and 
balances considering the manner state-owned institutions operated. Some of the 
parastatal organizations were actually mandated to perform a dual role both as 
regulators and as business entities.
48
 For example, statutory entities in the 
communications, energy and agricultural sectors were mandated to regulate business in 
those sectors while at the same time doing business in those same sectors. Under such 




Secondly, the dominance of government in the business sector through the prevalence 
of parastatal bodies in the economy meant that business activities were overly 
politicized.
50
 The appointment of directors for parastatal organizations and that of the 
chief executive officers was vested in government. For that reason, such appointments 
took a political dimension. This politicization of business tended to undermine the 
rationale of effectiveness and efficiency in those organizations.
51
 In some instances, 
the powers of the parastatal organization’s board of directors were not defined; there 
existed a plethora of agencies claiming authority over the parastatal body. Such 
agencies included: the holding corporation, the parent ministry, parliament and 
numerous other state agencies. It was difficult to state where the powers of one agency 
stopped and those of another started. 
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The capacity to monitor and effectively evaluate performance in the private sector was 
also very low. The big private multinational corporations and the locally based foreign 
owned small and medium companies remained closed to public scrutiny. Once they 
complied with the licensing authorities, paid the taxes, satisfied the minimum labor 
and health standards, the rest was a preserve of the managers and shareholders. Issues 
of corporate governance as we know them today were of little consequence then. 
 
Despite the privatization and liberalization measures that the government is currently 
implementing, the country still has a sizeable state-owned economic sector.
52
 The 
government involvement in these organizations is on behalf of the people of Uganda, it 
is therefore a matter of public concern that these organizations operate with a measure 
of account ability, transparency, and other principles of corporate governance.
53
 With 
regard to the private sector, most private companies in Uganda are family-owned and 
of small and medium size. For this reason, their leadership and management has also 




The country is therefore faced with a situation that requires urgent reform to enhance 
corporate governance within the public and private sectors of the economy. The need 
for regulating corporate life in Uganda could never be more pressing than it is at the 
moment. The liberalization and privatization measures currently being implemented 
are inducing entry into the economy of a new variety of corporate bodies emanating 
from both within the country and outside. On the other hand, the introduction of the 
stock exchange has made the need to regulate corporate entities, particularly those 
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2.2.2 The evolution of company law 
 
The history of company law in Uganda is synonymous with Uganda’s legal history 
whose roots lie within the British legal system and common law jurisprudence. 
Therefore, company law refers to the Companies Act
55
 of Uganda and the relevant 
rules of English common law and doctrines of equity
56
 which apply to Uganda by 
virtue of the Judicature Act.
57
  Prior to the introduction of English company law, the 
Indian Companies Act of 1882 was the applicable law in Uganda.
58
 The Companies 
Ordinance No. 6 of 1923 replaced the Indian Act. The Companies Ordinance No.6 of 
1923 was repealed by the Companies Ordinance No.12 of 1935 which was also 
repealed by the current Companies Act. The current Companies Act of Uganda was 
enacted in 1958 as Act 1 of 1958 and it is a replica of the British Companies Act of 
1948. 
 
It remains to add that the Companies legislation of Britain on which the Uganda 
Companies Act is based has been overhauled several times over by amending and 
supplementing legislation in order to keep abreast of changes in that society.
59
 The 
British Companies Act of 1948 was replaced in 1985 and again in 2006. Save for a few 
isolated amendments, the Uganda’s Companies Act has not been revised in a 
comprehensive manner since its enactment. Minor amendments have been made to the 
Uganda’s Companies Act; in 1993 when the Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture 
Act
60
 introduced new provisions aimed at bringing certain public enterprises within the 
Companies Act, and in 1996 when the Capital Markets Authority Act
61
 revised the 
registration and regulation of public companies in Uganda. Despite these changes to 
the Companies Act, most aspects of company law had remained unchanged, prior to 
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the current reform process. It should be noted that the company law reform process in 
Uganda covered the entire Companies Act, however, this study is only concerned with 
the reforms in relation to corporate governance issues. 
 
2.2.3 The need for reform 
 
‘Internationally, company law review is a continuous process that ensures that 




Company law reform in Uganda was undertaken by the Uganda Law Reform 
Commission (ULRC). The Commission was established in 1990 by the Uganda Law 
Reform Commission Act.
63
 Prior to this enactment, law reform was the responsibility 
of the Department of Law Reform and Law Revision under the Ministry of Justice. In 
1995, with the promulgation of the Constitution, the Commission became a 
constitutional body by virtue of article 248 of the Constitution.
64
 This enhanced the 
mandate of the Commission to undertake law reform. The main function of the 
commission as provided in section 11 of the Uganda Law Reform Commission Act is 
to study and keep under constant review the Acts and other laws of Uganda with the 
view of making recommendations for their systematic improvement, development, 
modernization and reform with particular emphasis on the development of new areas 
in the law by making the laws responsive to the changing needs of the society in 
Uganda. 
 
The Government of Uganda, through the Uganda Law Reform Commission, embarked 
on the implementation of the Commercial Justice Reform Programme (CJRP). The 
CJRP is a component of a Sector Wide Approach Programme that brings together all 
the institutions within the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) aimed at improving 
institutional efficiency and service delivery. One of the components of the CJRP is the 
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reform and the modernization of commercial laws including those that govern 
companies, cooperatives, joint ventures and partnerships. 
 
The commercial law reform begun in 1996 as a sub-component under the legal sector 
component of the Uganda institutional capacity building project. The project engaged 
an American consultancy firm, Reid and Priest who reviewed commercial laws under 
their terms of reference. The consultants produced a report in 1997 in which they made 
proposals for the amendment of the Companies Act. No action was taken on the report 
until 2001 when the Uganda Law Reform Commission accessed funding from JLOS to 
complete the Companies Act reform process. The commission set up a task force 
which reviewed the background paper of the consultants and carried out further 
consultations with all the stakeholders. The task force made recommendations upon 
which the Companies Bill, 2004 was based. 
 
The reformers of company law in Uganda identified as their key objective for the 
reform, the need to have a modern law supporting a competitive economy in a 
coherent and accessible form, not only providing maximum freedom for participants to 
perform their proper functions but also recognizing the case for high standards and 
ensuring appropriate protection for all parties. It was also recognized that there is need 
to take into account current changes particularly globalization, harmonization of laws 
in the region, and modern patterns of regulation and ownership.
65
 As indicated earlier, 
the reform process covers the entire Companies Act, but this research is only 
concerned with corporate governance issues as contained in the Study Report on 
Company Law, the Companies Bill, 2004, and the Code of Corporate Governance. 
 
2.2.4 A changing environment 
 
As indicated earlier, the Uganda Companies Act is more than half a century old and 
has not been subjected to a comprehensive review to reflect the fundamental 
developments that have taken place in Uganda and elsewhere. The domestic and global 
                                                 
65
 Uganda Law Reform Commission (note 58) at 1. 
 20 
environment for enterprises has changed markedly since the 1950s. Corporate 
structures and financial instruments have undergone significant developments. Many 
old concepts have been abandoned or modified and new concepts have been 
developed. We now live in a world of greater globalization, increased electronic 
communication, greater sensitivity to social and ethical concerns, fast changing 
markets, greater competition for capital, goods and services. Uganda cannot afford to 
be left behind in this global changing environment.  
 
There is a growing recognition by companies and governments that there is a need for 
higher standards of corporate governance and ethics and greater interdependence 
between enterprises and the societies in which they operate. A number of corporate 
failures around the world have revealed serious defects in the prevailing standard of 
corporate governance and the administration of the law and have resulted in investors 
suffering extensive losses. 
 
2.2.5 Company law for a competitive economy 
 
In a study report on company law, the Uganda Law Reform Commission (ULRC)
66
 
observes that mobility of international capital has highlighted the need for domestic 
laws to be investor friendly and competitive with international trends. The rise in 
international trade and foreign investment since has made necessary the harmonization 
and modernization of company law, as well as the need to make specific provision for 
foreign companies to operate in Uganda. The growth of the small business sector has 
also created a need for simpler and more accessible laws. 
 
The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU)
67
 observes that Uganda, like 
other transition economies, now increasingly recognizes that corporate governance is 
an essential tool for prosperity and economic growth. Past microeconomic difficulties 
have been exacerbated by inadequate corporate governance, stemming from weak legal 
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and regulatory systems, inconsistent auditing standards, poor banking practices, 
unregulated capital markets, inefficient boards of directors and ignoring rights of 
minority shareholders. 
 
Corporate governance both in the public and private sector is critical to economic and 
social progress. Investors base decisions to invest not only on a company’s outlook, 
but increasingly also on its reputation and good corporate governance practices. As the 
public sector and state owned companies increasingly find it difficult to finance 
recurrent and development commitments from internal and budget resources, it is 
already well accepted that the private sector will be the vehicle for future growth in 
Uganda. To attract large investors and to increase public participation in the 
privatisation programmes in developing economies, sound corporate governance 




2.2.6 Regional co-operation 
 
The East African Community is the regional intergovernmental organisation of the 
Republics of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, with its headquarters located in Arusha, 
Tanzania. The East African heads of state signed the treaty for the establishment of the 




 The three East African 
countries cover an area of 1.8 million square kilometers and have a population of 82 
million people who share a common history, language, culture and infrastructure. 
These advantages provide the partner states with a unique framework for regional 
cooperation and integration. Rwanda and Burundi signed the treaties of accession into 
the East African Community on 18
th
 June 2007, formally joining Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania in the now enlarged regional economic community of a combined population 
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Prior to re-launching the East African Community in 1999, Uganda, Kenya and 
Tanzania had enjoyed a long history of corporation under successive regional 
integration arrangements. These have included the customs union between Uganda and 
Kenya in 1917, which the then Tanganyika now Tanzania later joined in 1927; the East 
African High Commission (1948-1961); the East African Common Services 





Uganda’s membership in the East African Community (EAC) and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has two relevant consequences. 
First, the increasing openness of Ugandan markets and that of its partners is part of the 
globalization process. The second is that Uganda has become party to the community 
legal harmonisation programme which is part of the single market enterprise. Although 
harmonization of the laws in the region does not mean that such laws should be 
identical, nevertheless, the laws should not be in conflict. With the customs union for 
East African States and cross-listing on the stock exchanges of the member states, 





2.3 The significance of corporate governance in Uganda 
 
Corporate governance is an effective policy instrument in many areas of the operation 
of the national economy. While it should certainly not be perceived as some sort of 
panacea, the widespread practice of good corporate governance can help to achieve 
multiple objectives in both developed and developing countries.
73
 Uganda, like other 
transition economies, now increasingly recognizes that corporate governance is an 
essential tool for prosperity and economic growth. Past economic hardships in the 
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country have been exacerbated by weak or inadequate corporate governance measures, 
stemming from weak legal and regulatory systems, inconsistent auditing standards, 
unregulated capital markets, inefficient boards of directors and ignoring the rights of 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
 
Nations compete for investment capital, and the assurances investors seek as they 
decide whether to provide that capital are universal. Investors ultimately choose to 
place their capital where they can understand the risks and believe their investment is 
most likely to be protected from fraud or other misuse.
74
 In Uganda, corporate 
governance both in the public and private sector is crucial to economic and social 
progress. As indicated above, investors base their decision to invest not only on the 
company’s outlook, but increasingly also on its reputation and good corporate 
governance practices. As the public sector and the remaining state owned companies 
increasingly find it difficult to finance recurrent and development commitments from 
internal and budget resources, it is well accepted that the private sector will be the 
vehicle for future growth of the economy. To attract large investors, sound corporate 
governance principles and practices must be in place. The economic strategy of 
Uganda is modernization of the economy through relying on markets and the efforts of 
entrepreneurs as the basis for efficient and productive economic activity. The 
government’s major role in Uganda’s private sector driven economy is mainly to 





The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda
76
 put down some of the advantages 
that would accrue to Uganda as a result of having a managerial regime that adheres to 
the principles of good corporate governance. The following advantages are identified: 
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 Companies benefit from having a levelled field upon which to conduct their 
competitive business. Once there is a known set of standards by which 
corporate entities are judged, it becomes easier for individual corporations to 
formulate their own standards of behavior; 
 Corporate governance directly attacks corruption to which most corporate 
entities are opposed; 
 Corporate governance recognizes and upholds the legitimate interests of all 
stakeholders of a company, including shareholders, boards of directors, 
managers, employees, creditors and others; 
 Good corporate governance is one pillar of good governance at the political 
level. The growth of corporate governance therefore signifies the growth of 
standards of transparency, accountability, probity, and integrity in the political 
and administrative spheres countrywide; 
 Corporate governance is essential for sustainable and long-term wealth creation 
for enterprises; and 
 Good corporate governance presumes the existence of sound societal norms 
that emphasise community/communal responsibility. 
It is important that Uganda puts in place and enforces principles of good corporate 
governance to reap the benefits associated with it. 
 
It is now well established that to reduce poverty and sustain stable societies, economies 
in every country should have stronger enterprises that can generate and increase 
employment, produce goods and services and create revenue for the investors. To 
strengthen companies, whether private or state owned; small, medium or large; listed 
on the stock exchange or not; there must be continuous investment of capital and 
human resources as well as consumer satisfaction and public confidence in the 
enterprises. To achieve these objectives, companies must have more than a track 
record of producing goods and services. They must have more than a share of the 
market. They must have good and effective management and must also be perceived to 
be properly managed. Corporate governance has therefore become very important in 
 25 





3. AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN 
UGANDA IN COMPARISON WITH REFORMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 




Corporate governance reviews have formed the core of many of the international 
corporate law reform processes. The focus has been on ensuring increased 
transparency and accountability and in a number of countries a host of additional 
requirements, especially in terms of reporting, have been adopted. The analysis of 
corporate governance reforms in Uganda is based on the principles of shareholder and 
investor protection; responsibilities of the board of directors; rights of stakeholders and 
compliance and enforcement of corporate governance guidelines.   
 
There are a lot of lessons for developing and emerging economies in the way corporate 
governance has been practiced in developed economies.
77
 Corporate governance law is 
reformed to keep abreast of developments in the world and the changing business 
landscape. It is critically important that enabling legislation that is compatible with 
international best practice is put in place. It is desirable that as Uganda seeks to reform 
one of the most important pieces of legislation, it should harmonize with other 
jurisdictions. Harmonizing is important because it reduces the cost and increases 
certainty both for overseas companies and investors, and for the local companies 
involved in international trade and investment. In this regard, a comparison of 
corporate governance reforms in Uganda is made with reforms that have been 
                                                 
77
 Madhav Mehra ‘Corporate Governance: An Alternative Model’ in Ho Khai Leong (ed) Reforming 
   Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia: Economics, Politics and Regulations (2005) at 14. 
 26 
undertaken in South Africa and United Kingdom. It should be noted that this 
comparative analysis is based on specific corporate governance aspects which the 
researcher considers relevant to Uganda. It is therefore not the purpose of this study to 
set out and analyze comprehensively all the corporate governance principles and 
guidelines. 
 
3.2 Sources of corporate governance guidelines in Uganda 
 
Over the recent years, like in other developing economies, Uganda has embarked on 
the reform of the corporate governance regulatory framework. The Ugandan corporate 
governance regulatory framework can be divided into statutory and non-statutory 
controls. Statutory controls consist of legal provisions while the non-statutory 
regulations include written codes and rules. This study analyses the most important 
principles of corporate governance as contained in the Study Report on company law, 
the subsequent Companies Bill, 2004 and the Code of Corporate Governance. As 
stated earlier, other bodies like Capital Markets Authority and the Institute of 
Corporate Governance of Uganda have come up with guidelines on corporate 
governance which apply to particular companies. However, these guidelines are not 
intended to be a subject of a comparative analysis in this study. 
 
As indicated earlier, company law reform in Uganda was carried out by a taskforce of 
the Uganda Law Reform Commission
78 which reviewed the background and working 
papers produced by the consultants.
79
 The report of the Commission contains proposals 
and recommendations upon which the Companies Draft Bill, 2004 was based. The 
reform process involved the review of the Companies Act
80
 with a view to replacing it 
with a modern Companies Act that is in line with government policies of private sector 
development, increasing business efficiency, creating a conducive environment for 
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investment and increasing Uganda’s competitiveness both in regional and international 
markets.
81
 The Bill seeks to replace the existing Companies Act.
82
 The reformers 
observed that while the present law in its entirety is relevant to the Ugandan situation, 
some parts of it needed to be updated to fit current trends. Therefore, the proposed law 
is not totally new because it does not seek to change the fundamental and underlying 
principles of company law. The Companies Bill is presently before Cabinet for 
approval before it is forwarded to Parliament for discussion.    
 
In Uganda most of the corporate governance principles are contained in a Code of 
Corporate Governance
83
 which has been included as  Table F in the Schedule to the 
Companies Bill. Section 11 of Uganda’s Companies Bill which provides for the 
application of the Code provides that; 
 
‘A company may, at the time of registration of its articles or subsequently, 
adopt and incorporate into its articles all or any of the codes of good corporate 
governance contained in Table F and in a case where a company adopts all or 
any of the codes in Table F, a printed copy for that table shall be annexed to or 
incorporated in each copy of its articles of Association.’ 
 
This provision means that application of the Code is voluntary and only applies to a 
company which chooses to include the Code in its articles of association. It should be 
noted that once a company has incorporated the Code in its articles of association, it 
will be bound by it. On the other hand, the section has an option of a company 
choosing which of the provisions in the Code to include in the articles. Unlike in other 
jurisdictions
84
 where the Codes are voluntary and there is an option of comply or 
explain, in Uganda, companies will have the option of choosing to be bound by the 
Code or not, by including or excluding the Code or part of it from the articles. 
However, once a company has included the provisions of the code in its articles, then it 
must comply with those provisions. On the whole, the Code provides good corporate 
governance guidelines for those companies which choose to be bound by it.  
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3.3 Corporate governance principles 
 
In the wake of the financial scandals in the United States and the growing international 
concern over corporate governance, the Organization of Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD)
85
 Council, at Ministerial level at its meeting of May 1999 in 
Paris, endorsed the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance. In 2002, the OECD 
Council of Ministers launched a new initiative to strengthen corporate governance by 
carrying out an assessment within the member countries and came up with new 
corporate governance guidelines in 2006. The OECD principles of corporate 
governance
86
 cover five areas: 
 The rights of shareholders. 
The corporate governance framework should protect shareholders rights. 
 The equitable treatment of shareholders. 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of 
all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders 
should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. 
 The role of stakeholders 
The corporate governance framework should recognize the right of 
stakeholders as established by law and encourage active cooperation between 
corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of 
financial sound enterprises. 
 Disclosure and transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including 
the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company. 
                                                 
85
 OECD is an international organization helping governments tackle the economic, social and 
    governance challenges. It originated in 1948 as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
    (OEEC) to help administer the plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Later its 
    membership was extended to non-European states and in 1961 it was reformed into the Organization 
    for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD currently has thirty full members. 
86
 OECD Principles of Corporate governance (2004). Available at 
    http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf [Accessed on 27 June 2007]. 
 29 
 The responsibility of the board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of 
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the 




 opined that ‘the OECD principles are by no means carved in stone’ 
in that they provide a general framework, enabling states to mould them according to 
their unique developmental experiences to build their own rules. 
 
As the King Committee
88
 observed, companies are governed within the framework of 
the laws and regulations of the country in which they operate. Since countries differ in 
culture, regulation, law and generally the way business is done, there can be no single 
generally applicable corporate governance model. However, there are international 
standards that no country can escape in the era of global investor. Thus, international 
guidelines have been developed by the OECD, the International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN),
89
 and the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance 
(CACG).
90
 The four pillars of fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency 
are fundamental to all these international guidelines of corporate governance.
91
 
The principles are intended to assist OECD and non-OECD governments in their 
efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for 
corporate governance in their countries and to provide guidance and suggestions for 
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stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the 
process of developing good corporate governance. It is stated that the principles are not 
intended to substitute for government, semi-government or private sector initiatives to 
develop more detailed “best practice” in corporate governance. Therefore the analysis 
of the corporate governance reforms in Uganda is based on the internationally accepted 
principles of corporate governance of which the OECD principles form par 
 
3.4 The board and the directors 
3.4.1 The role and composition of the board 
 
The Uganda Code of corporate governance which I will refer to as ‘the Code’,
 
provides 
that the board is accountable for the performance and affairs of the company, and in 
the performance of its duties is expected to act in good faith, with due diligence and 
care and in the interest of the company.
92
 The Code further provides that the board 
should be composed of a balance of executive and non executive directors, where the 
non-executive directors are the majority and sufficient non-executive directors should 
be ‘independent’ directors. An independent director is defined by the Code as a non-
executive director who: 
 does not represent or was not nominated by a major shareholder; 
 was not employed by the group in the past three financial years; 
 is not an immediate family member of a person who is, or was in the 
past three financial years, employed in an executive capacity; 
 is not a professional advisor; 
 is not a significant supplier to, or customer of the group; 
 has no significant contractual relationship with the group; and 
 is free from any business or other relationship, which could materially 
interfere with his/ her ability to act independently. 
 
In South Africa, the King Code has a similar provision on the role and the composition 
of the board. 
 
The King report summarises the role of the board thus: 
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‘The board should be able to exercise objective judgment on the corporate 
affairs of the company, independent of management but with sufficient 
management information to enable a proper and objective assessment to be 
made by the directors collectively. The board should guide and set the pace of 
the company’s current operations and further development and in so doing 
should regularly review the present and future strengths, weaknesses and 




The UK Combined Code provides that the board should include a balance of executive 
and non-executive directors and in particular independent non-executive directors such 
that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision 
taking. The Code further provides that ‘except for smaller companies, at least half the 
board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by 
the board to be independent. It is stated in the Code that a smaller company should 
have at least two non-executive directors. This distinction between small and big 
companies is important especially for small companies which do not require big 
boards. 
  
The requirement for a big number of independent non-executive directors may not be 
easily applied in Uganda because of lack of sufficiently experienced directors to take 
on directorship.
94
 Accordingly, there is a risk that the few available persons who 
possess the required qualifications may over-commit themselves by accepting 
numerous directorships. This may lead to inefficiency because of work overload. 
Secondly, the applicability of this provision to private companies will of course 
depend on the size of the board. However, the general recommendation of including 
non-executive independent directors on the board is important for ensuring 
transparency and accountability. There is growing recognition by business 
communities across the world that, if companies are to attract long term capital, they 
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need to demonstrate transparency both in their internal structures and their 
communications with the market. The appointment of suitably qualified non-executive 
and independent directors is a critical factor for good corporate governance in Uganda. 
For private companies, especially family-owned businesses which dominate the 
economy, independent directors can assist in resolving disputes involving management 
or family members; can assist the company in its business operations by providing 
dispassionate advice; and through the selection of the independent auditor, can create 
credibility for the company’s financial statements in the minds of the banks, other 
financial institutions, and investors. 
 
3.4.2 Chairperson and chief executive officer 
 
There are two distinct tasks at the top of every company: the running of the board and 
the executive responsibility for running the company’s business.
95
 It is further argued
96
 
that the role of the chairman of the company, who is responsible for the former, should 
be separated from that of the chief executive officer, who is responsible for the latter; 
there should be a clear and unambiguous division of responsibility at the helm of the 
company to ensure a balance of power and authority. 
 
The chairperson of the board plays a central role in ensuring the proper functioning of 
the board; he acts as an important channel of communication between the board and 
management of the company, it is his duty to ensure that the board is properly briefed 
on the issues arising at board meetings so that directors are able to ask the right 






 states that there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the 
head of the company, ensuring a balance of power and authority, so that no one 
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individual has ‘unfettered powers or authority’ (Code 2.3.1(b)). This is aimed at 
preventing a chief executive with a dominating personality imposing his or her will on 
the board by acting as chairperson as well. The Code further states that where the roles 
of the chairperson and chief executive are combined, there should be either an 
independent non-executive director serving as deputy chairperson, or a strong 
independent non-executive director element on the board. Furthermore, where these 
roles are combined, this needs to be justified each year in the company’s annual report. 
 
The UK Combined Code has a similar provision which states that ‘there should be a 
clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the 
board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. It is 
further indicated that no one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. The 
Code provides that if exceptionally a board decides that a chief executive should 
become chairman, the board should consult major shareholders in advance and should 
set out its reasons to shareholders at the time of the appointment and in the next annual 
report. 
 
In Uganda, most companies are private and the role of the chairperson and the chief 
executive officer are combined and vested in one person. For these private and family 
owned companies, the recommendation may not be of concern. The size of most of 
these companies does not require the separation of the roles of the chairman of the 
board and that of the chief executive officer. Secondly, most of these companies do not 
have the resources necessary for the separation of those roles. However for the few 
public companies and the large private companies, the recommendation is important to 
guard against concentration of power in the hands of a single individual. 
  
3.4.3 Appointment of directors 
 
At common law, a person’s appointment as director is complete on his appointment to 




 It is a rule of company law that irrespective of the degree of control 
which a person may exercise over the affairs of the company, he does not in law 
occupy the position of director in the absence of actual appointment on proper 
authority.
100
 The process for the appointment of directors in Uganda is essentially 
controlled by the controlling shareholders. Section 184 of the Companies Act, which 
provides for the appointment of directors to be voted on individually, states that it must 
be done at a general meeting of the company. The same provision has been retained in 
the Companies Bill, 2004 as section 192. Unlike in other jurisdictions
101
, there is no 
recommendation made in the Report or the Code aimed at improving and 
strengthening the selection process especially of non-executive directors. 
 
In the case of UK, the Combined Code provides that there should be a formal, rigorous 
and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board. It is 
further provided that appointments to the board should be made on merit and against 
objective criteria. The Code has an important provision that ‘care should be taken to 
ensure that appointees have enough time available to devote to the job’. This provision 
will stop directors from taking on numerous appointments where they will have no 
time to concentrate on the affairs of the company. 
 
3.4.4 Meetings of the board 
 
A board of directors should meet sufficiently often to enable the directors to discharge 
their statutory and common law duties towards the company. The actual procedures for 
board meetings will be laid down in the articles, which will deal with matters such as 
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The Uganda Code provides that the board should meet at least once every three months 
and the number of meetings held and attendance of each director at meetings should be 
recorded in the annual report. The Code further provides that non-executive directors 
should have access to management without the executive directors being present. The 
provisions of the King Code in relation to board meetings are almost similar to the 
provisions of the Ugandan Code. The King report recommends that the board should 
meet ‘regularly, at least once a quarter, if not more frequently as circumstances 
require’. The frequency of meetings will depend on the complexity of the company, 
the volatility of the markets in which it operates, the amount of business that can 
reasonably be handled at a single meeting, and travelling considerations where 
directors are not all located in the same city as the company’s head office. In its 
commentary, the King report observes that boards have traditionally met at least once a 
quarter. However, King states that there is increasing evidence that this is not 
sufficient, given the heavy demands placed on the directors. Consequently, boards of 
large and complex enterprises meet up to six or eight times a year, based on up to five 
formally scheduled meetings and another two or so impromptu ones for consideration 
of special matters. 
 
In case of the UK, the Combined Code
103
 provides that the board should meet 
sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties effectively. There should be a formal 
schedule of matters specifically reserved for its decision. It further provides that the 
annual report should include a statement of how the board operates, including a high 
level statement of which types of decisions are to be taken by the board and which are 
to be delegated to management. It should be noted that the Combined Code does not 
offer guidance as to what “regular” means in terms of the frequency of the meetings of 
the board. Clearly this is something which will differ from company to company. It has 
been said that many companies have delegated quite large areas of responsibility to 
small committees of the board which meet on a monthly basis, reporting to main board 
meetings on a quarterly basis.
104
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For board members to exercise informed, intelligent, objective and independent 





The Uganda Code does not make provision for the access of information by the board 
members prior to board meetings. It should be noted that in order for the directors to 
be able to contribute adequately at the meetings, particularly in the case of non-
executive directors, it is important that directors have all the relevant information and 
have had time to apply their minds to it.
106
 The King report
107
 requires efficient and 
timely methods for informing and briefing board members prior to meetings; this will 
be the responsibility of the company secretary in most cases. Conversely, each board 
has a responsibility to be satisfied that, objectively, they have been furnished with all 
the material facts before making a decision. 
 
The provision in the King Code requiring boards to ‘meet at least once a quarter or 
frequently as circumstances require is important in that it does not restrict boards on 
the number of times they should meet. Therefore, the number of meetings will vary 
from organization to organization, depending on the circumstances of each 
organization. In principle, board meetings should be event-driven, rather than 
calendar-driven. For the board members to carry out their duties effectively, it is also 
important that the boardroom atmosphere is conducive for them to express their views 
without fear or favour. The chairman should not dominate the meetings and each 
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To justify the need for focused committees, T Wixley and G Everingham
108
 state that 
‘the board of directors of a typical listed company meets together for less than 24 
hours a year, a surprisingly short time to accomplish all that is expected of it.’ The 
authors further argue that although the modern company’s affairs are run on a day-to-
day basis by management, the formal board meeting is the time when the board as a 
whole, executives and non-executives, comes together for the sole purpose of 
discussing the company’s strategy and its implementation.
109
 Given that the time 
available to the board to accomplish all its tasks in a single meeting is not sufficient, 
some issues need to be dealt with in a focused way at subcommittee level, and then 
later presented to the board as a whole. 
 
There is recognition by business communities across the world that, if companies are 
to attract long-term capital, they need to demonstrate transparency both in their 
internal structures and in their communications with the market. A resourceful and 
dedicated audit committee, given full support by management, can enhance the 




 requires that ‘at a minimum, each board should have an audit and 
remuneration committee’ and indicates in its model terms of reference for board 
committees that ‘unless the board is small’, it should also have a nomination 
committee. It also recommends that other board committees may be appropriate 
depending on ‘industry and company specific issues’. In South Africa, the only 
statutory requirement under the Companies Act is for a company to have a board of 
directors. The provisions for board committees arose entirely as a result of the 
recommendations in the King report. According to the King report, committees may 
either be standing committees appointed to perform a continuing function or ad hoc 
committees constituted for a specific task. The King report recommends that board 
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committees should have clear mandates and areas of authority including written terms 
of reference, which should specify their composition, role and responsibilities, 
objectives, powers and authority, term of existence, the frequency of their meetings, 
and the manner in which reports back to the full board are to be dealt with. 
 
Following on the recommendations of the King Committee, the Companies Bill 
contains a provision for a statutory requirement of an audit committee. Section 87 of 
the Companies Bill provides that the board of a company may appoint any number of 
committees of directors and delegate any of the authority of the board subject to any 
limitation in the company’s memorandum of association. Section 100 of the Bill 
specifically requires the appointment of an audit committee by a public interest 
company. An audit committee is required to have at least two members who must be 
directors of the company but not involved in the day-today management of the 
company or related to any person involved in management of the company. The 
section further requires members of the audit committee to act independently in the 
performance of the committee’s functions. 
 
It has been argued
111
 that the danger of incorporating corporate governance 
requirements into legislation will have the effect of making the omitted requirements 
appear to be of less value. According to this argument, the inclusion of the audit 
committee into the Companies Bill will make other committees appear less important. 
According to the King Report,
112
 an audit committee is appointed ‘to assist the board 
in discharging its duties relating to the safeguarding of assets, the operation of 
adequate systems, control processes and the preparation of accurate financial reporting 
and statements in compliance with all applicable legal requirements and accounting 
standards’. The existence of a sound audit function is regarded as crucial to good 
corporate governance, and the audit committee from the point of view of corporate 
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governance, should be seen as the most important of the board committees.
113
 The 
audit committee provides an important channel of communication between the board, 
management, and the internal and external audit functions of the company. 
 
In Uganda, the provisions regarding audit committees are contained in the Code on 
corporate governance. This means that the provision only applies to those companies 
that choose to include the Code in their articles of association. It should be noted that 
the provision for audit committees as contained in the codes of best practice should 
remain as a guide to companies to comply or explain and if companies do not comply 
but explain why, that should be acceptable. Legislating for some board committees as 
South Africa has done for the audit committees, will first of all have the effect of 
making the omitted committees appear less important and secondly, it will create an 
inflexible structure which may be problematic to implement. 
 




, on the relationship between the company and its directors, states that: 
 
‘While the board has collective authority, each director has individual 
responsibility. Consequently, if a decision of the board subsequently turns out 
to have been a bad business judgment call and it is contended that this amounts 
to a failure in the duty of care, the law looks at the conduct of each director and 
his level of experience in deciding whether or not that director is responsible.’  
 
Another important area of corporate governance relates to the directors’ duties. The 
directors’ duties in Uganda are largely regulated by the common law and doctrines of 
equity.
115
 The principles of directors’ duties are, therefore scattered in a mass of 
decided cases which may not be accessible to both shareholders and directors or 
stakeholders of the company. Yet awareness of these principles is critical to their 
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enforcement by the affected individuals. For the purposes of good corporate 
governance, it is important for company law adequately to clarify rules governing the 
conduct of directors and the remedies available incase of violation of those rules. It 
should be noted that directors play a fundamental role in ensuring good corporate 
governance and their duties to the company should clearly be spelt out.  
 
3.6 Codifying directors’ common law duties 
 
The United Kingdom has codified the common law fiduciary duties of directors as 
well as the duty of care, skill and diligence. In the explanatory notes
116
 to the 
Companies Act
117
 the reasons advanced for the codification as recommended by the 
Company Law Review (CLR) include: 
 to provide greater clarity on what is expected of directors and make the law 
more accessible. In particular, they sought to address the key question ‘in 
whose interests should companies be run?’ in a way which reflects modern 
business needs and wider expectations of responsible business behavior; 
 to make development of the law in this area more predictable (but without 
hindering development of the law by the courts); 
 to correct what the CLR saw as defects in the present duties relating to conflicts 
of interests. 
Section 170(1) of the UK Companies Act makes it clear that, as in the existing law, the 
general duties are owed by a director to the company. It follows therefore that only the 
company can enforce those duties. However, the Act provides for derivative claims 
and actions by members which describe the mechanism whereby members may be able 
to enforce the duties on behalf of the company. 
 
On the question of ‘who are the duties owed by’, it is stated that the duties are owed by 
every person who is a director of a company as defined in section 250. They are 
therefore owed by a de facto director in the same way and to the same extent that they 
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are owed by a properly appointed director.
118
 In terms of section 170(2), some aspects 
of the duty to avoid conflict of interest and the duty not to accept benefits from third 
parties continue to apply even when a person ceases to be a director. This is necessary 
to ensure that a director does not exploit an opportunity of which he became aware 
while managing the company’s business without the necessary consent simply by 
resigning his position as director.
119
 The closing words of section 170(2) provide that 
these duties apply to a former director subject to necessary adaptations. This is to 





The following duties of directors have been codified: duty to act within power,
121
 duty 
to promote the success of the company,
122
 duty to exercise independent judgment,
123
 
duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence,
124
 duty to avoid conflict of 
interest,
125
 duty not to accept benefits from third parties,
126
 and duty to declare interest 




Section 170(4) provides that the general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the 
same way as common law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the 
corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and applying 
the general duties. This means that the wealth of jurisprudence available in decided 
cases is not lost and is to be referred to in interpreting the codified duties. It is also 
acknowledged
128
 that the statutory duties do not cover all the duties that a director may 
owe to the company. Many duties are imposed else-where in legislation, such as the 
duty to file accounts and reports with the registrar of companies. Other duties remain 
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uncodified, such as any duty to consider the interests of creditors in times of threatened 
insolvency. 
 
In the case of South Africa, it is acknowledged in the policy document
129
 that it is 
important to clarify the rules governing the conduct of directors and the remedies 
available for the violation of the rules. It is stated that a statutory standard for conduct 
and a clear statement of duties would assist in capturing case law set out in other 
jurisdictions and would give directors a degree of certainty about their duties, the 
standard for their conduct and associated liabilities. 
 
While recommending codification of directors duties, the policy document
130
 
acknowledges fears that codification may be difficult because there is little consensus 
in the legal community as to what precisely is the content of fiduciary duties of 
directors, which exist in common law. Furthermore, it is argued that some of the cases 
in this area are irreconcilable and this makes it difficult to point to the existing legal 
position with precision or certainty. It is recommended in the policy document
131
 that 
the benefits of a statutory standard for conduct of directors should be evaluated against 
the constraints it will place on the development of common law. 
 
Section 91 of the South African Companies Bill provides for standards of directors 
duties. The section states that a director, when acting in that capacity or as a member 
of a committee of directors, is subject to a duty to exercise the degree of care, skill and 
diligence and a fiduciary duty to act honestly and in good faith, and in a manner the 
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of, and for the benefit of, the 
company. The section further provides that in addition to the general duty of care, and 
fiduciary duty, a director must comply with the Act and the company’s memorandum 
of incorporation, and communicate to the board any material information that comes to 
his attention. Section 91(6) provides that the provisions of the section are in addition 
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to, and not in substitution for, any duties of the director of a company under the 
common law.  This means that like in the case of UK, regard will be had to common 
law duties of directors in aspects not covered under the Bill. 
 
It has been argued that it is important to codify directors’ common law duties but the 
difficulty lies in deciding whether the codification should be an exhaustive one or a 





that partial regulation would be the most appropriate for South Africa. She further 
argues that partial regulation serves the purpose of making the law easily accessible, 
whilst retaining some flexibility. On the other hand, the Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators of South Africa
134
 has argued that the danger of 
incorporating corporate governance requirements into legislation includes; ‘the 
omission of important requirements from legislation will be seen as making the 
omitted requirements of less value.’ 
 
It should be noted that both South Africa Companies Bill and UK Companies Act 
acknowledge that despite the attempted codification, some of the duties remain 
uncodified. In both cases reference is made to the common law duties. However, the 
Companies Act of UK provides a more detailed statutory standard for directors’ duties 
than the South African Companies Bill. As indicated earlier, Uganda has not attempted 
to codify directors’ duties and no guidelines have been provided in the Code in respect 
of directors’ duties. It is proposed that Uganda follows the example of the UK to 
codify directors’ common law duties. This is preferred because it gives a detailed 
statutory standard for directors’ duties which is a good reference point for all the 
directors and others who may require that information.  A provision should be included 
to make reference to common law duties in cases where gaps exist and regard should 
be had to common law in interpreting the codified duties. Such a move will not only 
make the law accessible and go some way to ensure that directors are clear about their 
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obligations, but it would clarify to foreign and domestic investors which rules govern 
the behavior of directors and what remedies are available when those rules are 
violated. 
 
3.7 Statutory duties of directors 
 
In addition to their common law responsibilities, directors have a number of statutory 
duties towards their company.
135
 These include; disclosure by directors of interests in 
contracts in terms of s 200 of the Companies Act; prohibition on loans to directors 
under s 191. These provisions have been retained in the Companies Bill, 2004 in 
sections 222 and 199 respectively. In addition, the Bill makes provision for substantial 
property transactions involving directors under section 223, duty of director to disclose 
shareholdings in own company in terms of section 229. Remedies in case of breach of 
these provisions are also provided in terms of sanctions and fines.  
 
In South Africa, sections 234-241 of the Companies Act
136
 provide that there must be 
disclosure of interest any director may have in a contract involving the company. Such 
disclosure is required to be made to the board by the affected director. The director 
may be considered to be interested in a contract with another company if, for example, 
he is a director or shareholder of that company. It is important that these disclosures be 
provided, because if they are not given, the contract may be voidable and the director 
may be liable to various charges under the Act. Section 226 of the Companies Act 
contains a general prohibition on the making of loans to directors. There are a number 
of exemptions, for example where the company carries on the business of money 
lending. There is also a general exemption where the consent of all shareholders is 
given; this is particularly helpful in the case of public companies seeking to lend 
money to their directors. Where such loans are made, there are disclosure requirements 
in terms of section 295 of the companies Act. 
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On the other hand, section 175 of the UK Companies Act provides that transactions or 
arrangements with the company do not have to be authorized by either the members or 
by the board; instead interests in transactions or arrangements with the company must 
be declared under section 177 (in the case of proposed transactions) or under section 
182 (in the case of existing transactions) unless an exception applies under those 
sections. Section 175 further permits board authorization of most conflicts of interest 
arising from third party dealings by the director, for example, personal exploitation of 
corporate resources and opportunities. Such authorization is effective only if the 
conflicted directors have not participated in the taking of the decision or if the decision 
would have been valid even without the participation of the conflicted directors. Board 
authorization of conflicts of interest will be the default position for private companies, 
but public companies will need to make provision in their constitutions to permit this. 
Baord authorization is not permitted in respect of the acceptance of benefits from third 
parties under section 176.  
 
3.8 Recognizing the rights of stakeholders 
 
Directors in the twenty-first century have to be seen to be directing companies 
to be good corporate citizens. The inclusive approach recognizes that a 
company is a link that brings together the various stakeholders relevant to the 
business of the company. 
Mervyn King, 
The Corporate Citizen: Governance for all entities (2006) 
 
A company’s stakeholders are ‘those whose relations to the enterprise cannot be 
completely contracted for, but upon whose cooperation and creativity it (the company) 
depends for its survival and prosperity’.
137
 This includes investors (the source of the 
company’s financial capital), the employees (the source of the company’s intellectual 
and human capital), customers (the source of the company’s revenue), suppliers and 
business partners, and the surrounding communities, government and society at large 
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(the source of the company’s ‘licence’ to operate). Defining the company’s 
stakeholders, identifying their sometimes conflicting interests, and maintaining a 
balance between these and the collective good of the company in which these 
stakeholders’ interests converge in equilibrium, are all integral to good corporate 
governance.
138
 It has been argued that participation by various stakeholders may 





A vital step in the strategic planning process is the definition of key stakeholders.
140
 A 
company’s stakeholders are ‘those whose relations to the enterprise cannot be 
completely contracted for, but upon whose cooperation and creativity the company 
depends for its survival’.
141
 This includes investors, employees, customers, suppliers 
and business partners, and the surrounding communities, government and society at 
large. It has been argued that satisfying stakeholders is both morally desirable and 
makes good business sense.
142
 Firms which build good relations with stakeholders gain 
competitive advantage. 
 
The corporate governance reform guidelines in Uganda as contained in the Report on 
company law, the Companies Bill, 2004 and the Code of corporate governance do not 
make provision for stakeholders’ involvement. It should be noted that companies in 
Uganda do not operate in a vacuum and cannot therefore shield themselves from a 
person or group interested directly or indirectly in the outcome of a company’s 
activities. 
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In UK, the Companies Act
143
 explicitly states that it is the directors’ duty to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in fulfilling 
this duty the directors must have regard to both short and long term factors and wider 
interests including employees, trade partners, the community and the environment. 
This approach is consistent with the view that stakeholder involvement is likely to 
influence long-term company performance
144
 and maximize overall wealth protection 




It has been argued that the relevant sections of the UK Companies Act on stakeholders 
will take sometime to bed down and will undoubtedly be subject to interpretation by 
the courts. The view that stakeholders other than shareholders have an interest in 
corporate governance is given some limited support in other laws, codes and 
documents. In the case of employee stakeholders, it is supported by certain aspects of 
employment law, which give employees the right to information and the right to 
consultation.
146
 While the Companies Act obliges managers to give due consideration 
to stakeholder interests, the regulation of specific rights for stakeholders or obligations 
is relatively dispersed and somewhat limited. Besides the new developments in the 
Companies Act, in other areas such as the Listing Rules, the Combined Code and in 
professional standards, one can find little systematic notion of broader stakeholder 
interests. However, this is not to say that there are no other forms of regulation, which 
play some part here, such as regulation of particular sectors, such as the employment, 
environment, which go someway to fill any gap on a sectoral needs basis. 
 
In South Africa, the King report states that although the principle that ‘directors and 
boards owe their duty to the company and thereby are accountable to the shareholders, 
as owners of the corporation capital’ remains paramount, ‘it must be acknowledged 
that global awareness is growing that any company’s long-term commercial success is 
inextricably linked to the development of the social and economic communities within 
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which it operates.’ One of King’s focal points on stakeholders is the move from single 
to triple bottom line accountability. The approach aims at achieving a balance between 
the needs of organizational prosperity, the human needs associated with the company’s 
business, and the needs of the environment – the people, planet and profit triad. It 
implies responsible development that ‘meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’, engenders 
good corporate citizenship, and improves a company’s risk management practices – 




Stakeholder participation in corporate governance certainly has important costs 
associated with it. Disclosure of corporate social responsibility or environmental 
impacts greatly increases the scope of information to be included in company reporting 
and raises issues of establishing objective and comparable standards across firms. 
Likewise, stakeholder voice may also have considerable impact on decision-making 
processes within the firm. In particular, employee involvement may slow down 
decision times. However, stakeholder involvement may have offsetting benefits of 
speeding up implementation once decisions have been made, since stakeholders will 
have higher levels of information and greater consensus around those decisions. This 
will have the effect of complementing other internal; and external monitoring 
mechanisms thereby promoting greater managerial accountability. It is therefore 
important that Uganda makes provision for stakeholders in the corporate law reform 
process. Provisions on stakeholders should be included in the Code of Good Corporate 
Governance following examples from South Africa and the UK. 
 
3.9 Shareholders’ rights and engagement 
 
Shareholders have a key role to play in driving long-term company performance and 
economic prosperity.
148
 Informed, engaged shareholders or those acting on their behalf 
are the means by which the directors are held to account for business strategy and 
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performance and by which investment decisions are taken that reflect the most 
efficient allocation of capital.
149
 The investment chain has become complex making 
communication up and down the chain difficult. On the other hand, rapid growth in the 
use of new information and communication technologies over the recent years presents 
greater opportunities to reduce costs and enhance the immediacy and transparency of 
dialogue between companies and shareholders. 
 
The UK Companies Act
150
 extensively provides for shareholder engagement in the 
governance of companies. This is done through enhancing the power of proxies and 
enfranchising indirect investors. Such provisions include: access to timely and 
transparent company information,
151





 shareholders’ right to sue directors for negligence (derivative 
claims),
154
 and the right to petition against unfair prejudice.
155
 The Combined Code 
outlines a number of further guidelines for shareholder activism that go beyond voting 
at AGMs and legal actions against directors. These principles are based on the 
principle of continuous engagement of shareholders. 
 
In the case of South Africa, four basic rights of shareholders are identified:
156
 a right to 
capital, a right to income, a right to vote and a right to information. It is recommended 
that the ambit of these rights should be determined in legislation, but recognizing that 
only a right to vote and a right to information are absolute. Thus in the explanatory 
memorandum,
157
 it is stated that ‘the law should protect shareholder rights, advance 
shareholder activism and provide enhanced protection for minority shareholders. The 
Companies Bill provides for shareholder meetings, right to information, facilitation of 
proxy voting and electronic voting.
158
 The Bill also provides for shareholder remedies 
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including; shareholders’ right to information,
159
 application to protect shareholders’ 
rights,
160
 application to declare a director delinquent or under probation,
161
 application 
for relief from oppression or prejudicial conduct,
162
 dissenting shareholders’ appraisal 
rights,
163






 recommends the encouragement of corporate-governance-focused 
shareholder activism, particularly amongst institutional investors. An environment 
should be created for shareholders to be more than speculators, to be owners concerned 
with the well-being of the company in which they invested, and constantly to check 
whether the directors of the company practice good corporate governance.
166
 To 
encourage shareholder activism, King Report recommends; educating shareholders in 
corporate governance, introduction of class actions and a contingency-fee system to 
encourage legal action, review of quorum requirements to encourage participation at 
general meetings, establishment of shareholder watch-dog organizations to look after 
the interests of minority shareholders, and the role of institutional investors in 
achieving successful corporate governance. 
 
In addition to the provisions on shareholder rights to vote and to a proxy which have 
been included in the Companies Bill, Uganda’s company law reform should make 
provision for; access to timely and transparent company information, minority 
shareholders’ rights, right to apply to court for redress on behalf of the company, and 
in this era of information technology, e-communication should be encouraged. It is 
recommended that Uganda follows the examples of UK and South Africa to enhance 
shareholder enhancement in the governance of companies with the necessary 
modifications to suit Uganda’s circumstances.  
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3.9.1 Shareholder remedies 
 
The majority shareholder rule states that where it is legally necessary to enforce a duty 
owing to the company, the only plaintiff is the company itself.
167
 However, since the 
company is in reality a fiction, the power to litigate on its behalf must be vested in 
some person or group, which has been identified as the majority of the shareholders in 
a general meeting.
168
 Low Chee Keong
169
 argues that shareholder suits are far and few 
between due to the decision in Foss v Harbottle.  The rules, i.e. the proper plaintiff rule 
and the internal management rule, in the case have had the unintended consequence of 
placing a major obstacle in the way of minority shareholders given that companies are 
unlikely to bring an action against their directors or majority shareholders for breach of 
duty or acts of bad governance. However, the door is not completely closed on 
minority shareholders as they are, in limited circumstances, allowed to sue on behalf of 
the company by way of a derivative action or to bring personal actions.
170
 In terms of 
effective corporate governance, the rule in the Foss case and its exceptions where a 
shareholder may bring an action needs to be codified in Uganda. 
 
3.9.2 The derivative action 
 
The derivative action is an action brought by an individual shareholder on behalf of 
himself and other members except the wrong-doers to remedy a wrong done to the 
company and which cannot otherwise be corrected because of the reluctance or refusal 
of the majority wrong-doers to rectify the wrong.
171
 This remedy falls broadly within 
the fraud on the minority or company exception under the rule in Foss v Harbottle. In 
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terms of corporate governance in Uganda, this rule requires codification to clarify the 
circumstances under which a derivative action can be brought. 
 
In South Africa, the Companies Bill, 2007
172
 abolishes any right at common law of a 
person other than the company to bring or prosecute any legal proceedings on behalf of 
the company. The section provides that a person may serve a demand upon a company 
to commence or continue legal proceedings, or take related steps, to protect the 
interests of the company if the person is a shareholder, a former shareholder, or a 
person entitled to registered as a shareholder, of a company or a related company; or a 
director or a registered trade union. 
 
It must however be recognized that the path to litigation is fraught with practical 
difficulties for the minority shareholders. First, they must take cognizance of the fact 
that they are potentially liable for the costs of initiating the action in the name of the 
company. Secondly, they have no corresponding right to potential damages that may 
be awarded by the court since these go to the company. Thirdly, the courts have often 
been persuaded to give due regard to whether the alleged breach may be ratified by the 
general meeting. Lastly, the inability to access information, which flow is controlled 
by the directors, by the minority shareholders is a substantial obstacle to the 
commencement of a proper action. 
 
It is for the forgoing reasons that the researcher recommends the introduction in the 
Uganda’s Companies Act of the statutory derivative action that will empower the court 
to consider factors such as the good faith of shareholders and the interests of the 
company, rather than whether the case falls within the established exceptions to the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle, in determinig whether a shareholder should be allowed to sue 
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3.9.3    The alternative remedy to winding up the company  
 
Section 211 of the Companies Act, permits a member of the company who complains 
that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some 
part of the members, himself inclusive, to petition the court for relief. Bakibinga
173
 
argues that in its life in other jurisdictions, the corresponding provision was so 
restrictively interpreted that petitioners under it only succeeded in three cases.
174
 He 
further argues that the provision has since been reformed in other Commonwealth 
countries
175
 which would provide an example for the reform of section 211 in Uganda. 
It should be noted that the Companies Bill, 2004 has retained this provision
176
 without 
any adjustment despite the recommendation made in the Report
177
 to review it. 
 
Ever since the landmark case of Foss v Harbottle it has become increasingly evident 
that minority shareholders in any corporate body need a certain amount of protection 
from the sometimes unfair actions of the majority shareholders who might even be the 
directors. According to the current law, the only remedy available to the minority 
shareholders is to petition for the winding up of the company on the “just and 
equitable” ground. This essentially means that the only way of addressing the 
grievances of the minority shareholder is to windup the company which may not 
necessarily be the solution that might be sought by a minority shareholder, especially if 
the company is a profitable one. 
 
In South Africa, the Companies Bill, 2007 proposes to reform this principle. Section 
164 of the Bill provides that a shareholder, creditor or director of a company may 
apply to court for relief if any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has 
had a result that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or disregards the interest of the 
applicant. The section further empowers court to order a wide range of remedies. 
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Section 162 of the Bill also provides that a shareholder of a company may apply to a 
court for a declaratory order determining any rights of a shareholder in terms of the 
Act, the company’s memorandum of incorporation or any rules of the company for 
appropriate orders to protect the rights of the shareholder or rectify any harm done to 
the shareholder by the company. In terms of section 159 of the Bill, where any person 
is entitled to apply for a remedy under the Act, that right extends to persons acting on 
his behalf, a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons, a person acting in public interest, or an association acting in the interest of its 
members. 
 
In South Africa and the United Kingdom where the provision has been reformed, the 
category of petitioners who have locus standi to apply in respect of oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial conduct against a petitioner has been widened to include officers 
and creditors of the company, personal representatives of the deceased member and 
any other person deemed appropriate to petition the court. The reinforcement of 
section 211 in the Uganda’s Companies Act will provide an individual shareholder 
additional power for enforcing the company’s duties. 
 
3.10 Corporate governance in private businesses and other small organizations 
 
In the wake of corporate scandals, widespread unethical behavior, and illegal activity 
in some of the most respected organizations, corporate governance has become 
important in both public and private organizations.
178
 Privately-owned companies 
especially those with a serious desire to grow and perhaps someday get stock exchange 
listings of their own, should consider adopting key elements of corporate governance 
simply because it will be good for business.
179
 Private enterprises especially those with 
employee owners need to ground their organizations upon solid foundations of fiscal 
and management responsibility to avoid problems that could interfere with their 
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 Good corporate governance will help private companies to gain access to 
good advice, talent and money. It also sets to rest the concerns of service providers the 
company deals with. Accountants, bankers, consultants and venture capitalists, to 
name four of the most prominent handmaidens to company growth, all like to see well-
established processes and systems in place because they imply order and stability.
181
  
Private companies need to adopt “best practices” and transparency to assure private 
investors, employee owners, workers, and their society of their integrity, as well as to 
suit themselves for possible or eventual IPOs, mergers, or acquisition by a public 
company. While the various new rules and regulations are extensive, some of the most 
important new practices that apply to private boards and enterprise governance require: 
new and significant levels of director independence, directors that have financial 
knowledge, increased work and due diligence on the part of directors, establishing 
written guidelines and codes of ethics, and in some cases, that directors conduct 




Unlike public companies, which increasingly have the specifics of governance spelled 
out for them by laws and regulations, small and medium-sized private companies first 
have to figure out what governance means to them and then adopt the structures and 
processes they need. Even though well-developed governance processes are not 
mandatory for private companies, the recent corporate scandals have led service 
industries such as accountancy to expect higher standards in the companies they serve, 
both public and private. And for growing companies that will need access to capital, 
good governance may not be an option. 
 
Although the King Code does not apply to organizations other than listed companies, 
banks, insurance companies, public entities and other state bodies, it does suggest that 
those organizations which fall outside its net should consider applying its principles. 
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To a small business owner, corporate governance may seem an unnecessary luxury. 
The simple battle to survive is enough for many people. More rules and procedures are 
seen to add extra complications and increase the risk of failure.
183
 It is a well 
documented fact that the vast majority of new ventures fail within the first year of their 
establishment.
184
 First among the reasons for failure is the difficulty of obtaining 
finance; next is the need to master all the different skills required by even the smallest 
business. Poor corporate governance is seldom seen as a reason for the failure of a 
small business. 
 
As private companies continue to seek equity capital from sources other than the 
pockets of the founders, many providers of development capital to small companies 
believe governance procedures are an aid to sound management.
185
 Accordingly, some 
capital providers commonly require specific provisions for corporate governance to be 
built into the contractual relationship governing the terms upon which they introduce 
capital to private companies.
186
 These include: 
• the right to appoint an independent director or directors; 
• a requirement that board meetings should be held regularly; 
• a requirement that paper work for meetings should be comprehensive and 
formal; 
• monthly management accounts comprising a profit and loss account, balance 
sheet and cash flow forecast; 
• sometimes new auditors. 
In addition, investors clearly have a legitimate interest in the size of salaries and other 
payment made to the directors and senior staff.
187
 This may not justify the appointment 
of a remuneration committee, but the principle of accountability to shareholders is the 
same. Similarly, there is no need for an audit committee, but high standards of auditing 
and relationship with the auditors are important. The presence of non-executive 
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directors on the boards of private companies requires a particularly sensitive approach. 
There may be a mismatch of expectations which can be alleviated by setting out terms 
of the appointment in a simple letter, with detailed preliminary discussions between 
the director concerned and senior staff. 
 
The impact of company law on business development in Uganda is in some respects 
tied up with the regulation of small companies. At the moment, the regulatory 
requirements for both private and public companies are similar.
188
 The need for 
instance to comply with the statutory requirements to: hold annual general meetings,
189
 
keep accounts and appoint auditors,
190
 have a company secretary,
191
 file annual 
returns
192
 tend to be unduly burdensome for many private small companies. The 
Companies Bill, 2004 has retained similar provisions. Bakibinga
193
 states that a private 
sector survey revealed that on average, 15% of management time was consumed by 
regulatory compliance activity, with some firms reporting as much as 40%. This has to 
change given the critical role played by small firms in Uganda in creating employment, 
experimentation and innovation that leads to technological improvement and economic 
growth. Therefore, although corporate governance is important for both private and 
public companies, the application and enforcement of corporate governance principles 
among small private companies should be relaxed. 
  
3.11 Administration, compliance and enforcement  
 
Section 386 of the Uganda Companies Act, cap. 110, provides for the designation of a 
registrar to be responsible for the registration of companies under the Act. The section 
further makes provision for such deputy and assistant registrars, clerks and servants to 
assist the registrar in carrying out his duties under the Act. Section 389 of the Act 
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provides for the enforcement of the duty of a company to make returns to the registrar. 
The Companies Bill, 2004 retains the same provisions. 
 
The problem with the Act is that it does not adequately provide for the duties and 
functions of the registrar. While in some jurisdictions there is a special body to 
administer the Companies Act, in Uganda, the administration of the Act remains under 
the Registration Services Bureau in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. 
The Bureau, headed by the registrar general, is not equipped to investigate alleged 
breaches contained in the Companies Act and does not have the capacity to police all 
the companies in Uganda. There is need to establish a specialized institution to monitor 
the progress of enforcement of corporate governance regulations and guidelines in 




 made the following observation regarding compliance and 
enforcement; ‘[a]ll principles embodied in a code of corporate governance are effective 
only if adequate remedies and sanctions exist to enforce compliance with those 
principles.’ Rules are only as effective as their enforcement.
195
 Thus, while social and 
cultural dimensions are significant, the importance of improving the enforcement of 
existing laws and regulations cannot be overemphasized. There is need to have the 
necessary infrastructure in place to enable effective enforcement. Besides regulations 
and codes of conduct, corporate governance reforms have to aim at progressively 
strengthening the existing institutional framework to ensure compliance and 
enforcement.  
 
Company law reform should ensure that through a proper system of corporate 
governance, disclosure and exposure to market forces, wrongdoing is discouraged and 
punished. It was observed
196
 that traditionally, company laws have left the 
enforcement of their provisions to shareholders, the liquidator in winding-up, and the 
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Director of Public Prosecutions. It was further noted that ‘experience has shown that 
these methods of enforcement are inherently defective’.
197
 It was established that an 
independent and suitably empowered body is necessary, charged with the duty to 
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act that wrongdoers are brought to book 
effectively and efficiently.
198
 In South Africa, the Companies Bill makes provision for 
a new institutional framework consisting of a Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission aimed at ensuring proper administration, compliance with, and 
enforcement of the provisions of the Companies Act. It is recommended that Uganda 
puts in place a specialized body charged with the administration of company matters 
especially with regard to corporate governance issues. 
 




 provides that the Code applies to business enterprises as stated in 
the code. These include: all companies with securities listed on the JSE securities 
exchange, banks, financial and insurance entities, and public sector enterprises and 
agencies that fall under the Public Finance Management Act. King report also 
encourages other companies not mentioned to give due consideration to the application 
of the code insofar as the principles are applicable. It is stated that the code should be 
applied in addition to requirements contained in statutes, regulations and other 
authoritative directives regulating the conduct and operation of such enterprise. 
 
Some tenets of the King code of corporate governance are now compulsory for 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), those companies must 
report compliance with the Code in their annual statements. Each company director 
must certify that he or she is satisfied that the company has complied with the listing 
requirements. The JSE Listing Requirements
200
 provides that applicant issuers must 
include in the pre-listing statement, a narrative statement of how it has applied the 
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principles set out in the King Code, a statement of the company’s compliance with the 
Code and the reasons for each and every instance of non-compliance. The Listing rules 
further state the specific requirements concerning corporate governance that listed 
companies must disclose their compliance therewith in their pre-listing statements. 
 
In its preamble, the UK Combined Code states that the Code applies to listed 
companies with a requirement that companies make a disclosure statement reporting 
on how it applies the principles in the code. Secondly, the company has either to 
confirm that it complies with the code’s provisions or, where it does not, to provide an 
explanation. The Combined Code further states that small listed companies may judge 
that some of the provisions are disproportionate or less relevant in their case, but such 
companies are encouraged to adopt the approach in the Code. 
 
The provisions in both the King Code and the Combined Code give direction on the 
applicability of the corporate governance principles provided in the codes. The Uganda 
Code of Good Corporate Governance does not specifically state the enterprises to 
which it applies. Section 11 of the Uganda Companies Bill, states that a company may 
adopt any or all of the provisions of the code and incorporate them in its articles of 
association. This provision leaves companies in Uganda at liberty to choose either to 
apply the code or not. The enforcement of the code in this case becomes difficult since 
it is not meant to apply to specific enterprises. An approach as that adopted by the 
King Code is recommended for Uganda, which applies the code to a wide range of 
enterprises including; listed companies, banks, financial and insurance entities and 
public sector enterprises. This is particularly important because most companies in 




The application of the Code on corporate governance in Uganda is different from the 
situations in both South Africa and UK in that under section 11 of the Companies Bill, 
once a company has chosen to include the Code in its articles, it will be bound by its 
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provisions. Therefore application of the code is by choice since if a company does not 
include the Code in its articles, it will not be obliged to comply with its provisions. So, 
unlike in UK and South Africa, there is no option of comply or explain. It is important 
that the code is applied to specified business enterprises which should have the option 
to comply or explain non-compliance. 
 
3.11.2 Consequences of breach of directors’ duties 
 
Weak enforcement of rules and regulations has been a perennial concern for investors 
in emerging markets. A precarious balance exists between sensible regulations and 
unreasonable enforcement.
202
 Theoretically, the most effective internal monitors of 
corporate governance are the directors.
203
 The King Report establishes the board of 
directors as central to the South African corporate governance system, with ultimate 
accountability and responsibility for the performance of the dealings of the company. 
In view of the responsibility put on the directors of a company either by statute or 
common law, there is need to provide for consequences of breach of such 
responsibility. 
 
Section 178 of the UK Companies Act provides for the preservation of existing civil 
remedies for breach or threatened breach of general duties. The remedies for breach of 
the general duties are the same as those available for breach of common law duties. 
Section 178(2) makes it clear that the duties are enforceable in the same way as any 
other fiduciary duty owed to a company by directors, except for the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence, which is not considered to be a fiduciary duty. It is 
stated in the Explanatory Notes to the UK Companies Act that in the case of fiduciary 
duties, the consequences of breach may include: 
 damages or compensation where the company has suffered loss; 
 restoration of the company’s property; 
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 an account of profits made by the director; and 
 rescission of a contract where the director failed to disclose an interest. 
The above is in addition to other remedies available to the shareholders of the 
company. 
 
Section 93 of the South Africa draft Companies Bill makes a director liable to the 
company and any other person for any loss arising from that director’s signing or 
agreeing to sign a false or misleading financial statement or prospectus, or be reckless 
in the conduct of a company’s business. Subsection (6) of section 93 provides that the 
section applies in addition to any rule of common law that is consistent with the 
section. In addition to this provision, the Bill provides for the protection of whistle-
blowers.
204
 This will go along way to encourage people to disclose information 
regarding breach of duty by the directors or other officers of the company without fear 
of liability for such disclosure. 
 
In order to improve corporate accountability, the South African Companies Bill makes 
it an offence for a director to sign or agree to a financial statement or prospectus that is 
false, misleading or untrue, or be knowingly party to the reckless carrying on of a 
business.
205
 Section 217 of the Bill provides penalties in case of breach of the duties 
for a fine or imprisonment of a term not less than 10 years. It should be noted that the 
Companies Bill has several sections detailing directors’ liabilities ranging from how to 
punish lies in a company prospectus to the real requirements on shareholder rights. 
 
Given the new liabilities heaped on directors in the draft Companies Bill, it may be 
difficult for companies to find people willing to act as directors. It is rather harsh, since 
directors can be sued in their personal capacity for virtually any loss that is suffered 
due to a company’s actions. On the other hand, Uganda has not dealt with the issue of 
consequences of breach of directors duties. Considering that Uganda has a limited 
source from which to choose directors, it is better not to heap a lot of liabilities on the 
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directors since this is likely to make it difficult for companies to find people willing to 
serve as directors. 
 
3.11.3 Disqualification of directors 
 
In South Africa, the policy document of Ministry of trade and industry,
206
 recommends 
that disqualification for directors should be clearly outlined in company law and 
should at least include un-rehabilitated insolvents and persons with certain categories 
of convictions. It suggests that the English Disqualification Act provides a framework 
for such disqualifications and may guide the drafters. The King Committee
207
 also 
recommends legislative changes to buttress the existing provisions of the Companies 
Act
208
 regarding directors’ disqualification. The King committee
209
 particularly 
recommended the amendment of the Companies Act to provide for the disqualification 
of persons who have been delinquent in the management of a company from being 
appointed as directors. The Companies Bill
210
 that has been published provides more 
adequately for the disqualification of directors and for a register of disqualified 
directors to be maintained by the registrar of companies. 
 
Section 163 of the Bill provides for the application to declare a director delinquent or 
under probation and gives a wide range of people who are eligible to apply and states 
the grounds for such an application. Other relevant sections are section 88(3) which 
provides that the election of a director is a nullity if, at the time of the election that 
person is disqualified in terms of section 89. Section 89 prohibits a person who has 
been disqualified from acting as director and a disqualified person under this section 
includes a person who has been declared by court to be a delinquent director or placed 
under probation in terms of section 163. 
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It has been argued that declaring directors delinquent would amount to blacklisting 
individuals and would discourage people from taking on directorship. However, it 
should be noted that declaring directors delinquent is a major innovation of the South 
African Companies draft Bill and is likely to act as check on the would be fraudulent 
directors. There is no provision in the Uganda Companies Bill on the disqualification 
of directors. A provision like that of South Africa is desirable in Uganda to check on 
fraudulent directors. 
 
On the other hand, in view of the difficult of bringing a successful action for wrongful 
trading, the disqualification unit of the Insolvency Service (an agency of the DTI in 
UK) has in recent years enormously increased the number of successful actions for 
disqualification against directors of insolvent companies under the Company Directors 
(Disqualification) Act of 1986.
211
 The DTI applies to court to make a disqualification 
order of between two and fifteen years against a person who is found to be “an unfit 
director” of an insolvent company. Disqualification can apply to offences under the 
Companies Act as well as insolvency, and it is often those offences, of a relatively 
technical nature, which will be used as background technical evidence to mount a 
successful application for disqualification.
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 Increasingly, failure to file accounts or 




3.11.4 Removal of directors 
 
Section 185 of the Uganda Companies Act preserves the right of shareholders to 
remove directors. The section provides that a company may by ordinary resolution 
remove a director anytime during his term of office regardless of provisions to the 
contrary in the memorandum or articles of association of the company. Special notice 
is required of any resolution to remove a director or to appoint someone else in his 
place. This provision has been retained in the Companies Bill
 
 as section 193. While 
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this provision is crucial, the law does not safeguard against capricious removals of 
directors by significant shareholders. 
 
In South Africa, section 88(5) of the Companies Bill provides that despite anything to 
the contrary in a company’s memorandum of incorporation, or any agreement between 
a company and a director, or between any shareholders and a director, a director may 
be removed by a special resolution at a meeting of holders of the shares entitled to be 
voted in an election of directors. The section further provides that such a director must 
have received notice of the meeting and the resolution, a statement setting out reasons 
for the resolution, with sufficient specificity to reasonably permit the director to 
prepare and present a response. Therefore, unlike in Uganda, the South Africa 
Companies Bill requires a special resolution for the removal of directors. 
 
  
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Corporate governance involves the balance of power with which the organization is 
directed, managed, supervised and held accountable. The basic theme of my study was 
to analyze the corporate governance reforms in Uganda in relation to developments in 
other jurisdictions with specific reference to the United Kingdom and South Africa. 
 
The Uganda corporate law and governance strategy aims to promote an effective 
framework for corporate governance in the country, giving confidence to investors, 
business, and other stakeholders to underpin the relationship between an organization 
and those who hold future financial claims against that organization. Since 1994, 
Uganda has undertaken corporate governance reforms that include a number of codes, 
review of the Companies Act and new regulations. The provisions as contained in the 
Companies Bill, 2004 and various codes and guidelines on corporate governance are 
commendable achievements and a base for future improvement and modification. 
Corporate law review is a continuous process that ensures that laws are reflective of 
market practices and societal needs. Therefore, Uganda should put in place 
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mechanisms to ensure constant review of corporate laws to keep up-to-date with trends 
taking place else-where in the world. 
 
It should be noted that a lot of time has passed since 2004 when the Companies Bill 
was drafted, more than a decade down the road; the Bill is just before cabinet. The 
delay in tabling the Bill before Parliament for debate and enactment into law means 
that however good the provisions are, they cannot be implemented. There is therefore 
need to speed up the process of putting in place the regulatory and institutional 
framework to ensure good corporate governance in the country. There is also need to 
establish a specialized body to co-ordinate the enforcement of various regulations on 
corporate governance. 
 
The inclusion of the Code on corporate governance as a Schedule to the Companies 
Bill is likely to make its implementation very difficult. Section 11 of the Bill makes the 
Code applicable to only those companies which choose to include it, or part of it, in 
their articles. The companies that will not include the Code in their articles will not be 
obliged to comply with its provisions. It is important to separate the Code from the 
Companies Bill, and spell out the companies to which it applies following the 
examples in South Africa and the United Kingdom. Those companies would be 
encouraged to comply with the provisions of the Code, or explain no-compliance. Such 
a move would make the Code applicable to a wide range of companies and the 
enforcement would not be very difficult. 
 
In addition to the nature of the laws and regulations on corporate governance, one must 
also consider the quality of the law enforcement in the country. The effectiveness of 
corporate governance legislation and regulations depends on the competence, integrity 
and forcefulness of the courts and regulatory agencies. The rules and decisions of 
certain private bodies, such as stock exchanges, professional accounting institutions 
and industry organizations, also influence corporate governance. There is need to 
equip the office of the Registrar of Companies to investigate alleged breach of the 
provisions of the Companies Act. A specialized institution should also be established 
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to monitor the progress of enforcement of corporate governance regulations and 
guidelines, in addition to role of criminal and civil courts in company law 
enforcement. 
 
The basic principles of corporate governance fairness, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility are relevant all over the world. Corporate governance is an effective 
policy instrument in many areas of the operation of the national economy. While it 
should certainly not be perceived as some sort of panacea, the wide spread practice of 
good corporate governance can help to achieve multiple objectives in both developed 
and developing countries. The principles, structure, and systems of corporate 
governance can and should be applied in a wide range of organizations – not just 
publicly listed joint stock companies, but also throughout the banking sector, in state 
enterprises, in cooperatives, and in the ever-growing and increasingly important NGO 
sector. To survive in the global market and to increase economic growth, Uganda must 
address the inherent challenges and meet international corporate governance standards 
while maintaining allegiance to the needs of the country.  
 
Clearly market economies require certain legislative and regulatory controls and 
Uganda is trying to put in place such regulatory framework. However, such controls 
are no substitute for corporate character, and ultimately the efficient exchange of goods 
and services will never occur in any market if the character of a contracting partner is 
in doubt. The government cannot legislate ethics and while regulatory systems and 
enforcement schemes may encourage people to follow the law, ultimately the decision 
to act responsibly must come from within. 
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